Endogenous timing of managerial delegation contracts in a unionized duopoly

Luciano Fanti and Nicola Meccheri ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2019, vol. 40, issue 7, 845-857

Abstract: In a multiple‐stage duopoly game with strategic delegation and unionized labor market, this paper analyzes whether firms' owners decide managerial incentive contracts sequentially or simultaneously. When firms compete in quantities, firms' owners can choose incentive contracts simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the unions' relative bargaining power and the degree of product differentiation. Instead, when firms compete in prices, firms' owners set incentive contracts sequentially with substitute goods and simultaneously with complement goods.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3050

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:7:p:845-857

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