Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: A two‐sided model

Mueller‐Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard

Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: A two‐sided model

Frank Mueller‐Langer and Richard Watt
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mueller-Langer

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2021, vol. 42, issue 8, 1945-1959

Abstract: We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two‐sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to the previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high‐quality journals. Second, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profits, and may increase social welfare.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3375

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:8:p:1945-1959

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