Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-sided Model

Frank Mueller-Langer and Richard Watt ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyse optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the (non-linear) externalities between readers and authors in a journal. We show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Besides, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profits, and may increase social welfare.

Keywords: Two-sided markets; academic journals; open access; removal of copyright; welfare effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L82 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-sog
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: a two-sided model (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenec:16277

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