Legal cost of contract enforcement and nonperforming loans: Is credit information sharing relevant?

Michael Adusei, Ngozi Adeleye and Beatrice Sarpong‐Danquah

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 6, 2501-2514

Abstract: We examine the impact of legal cost of contract enforcement on nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) with data from 132 countries. In addition, we examine whether this impact is sensitive to the income groups of countries and the presence of credit information sharing. We observe a robust negative association between legal cost of contract enforcement and NPLs in both full sample and subsample analyses. We also observe that in the presence of credit information sharing, the effect of legal cost of contract enforcement slowing down NPLs is constrained across all income groups except the low‐income one.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3540

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:6:p:2501-2514

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().