Reasons for Secrecy and Deception in Homeland‐Security Resource Allocation

Jun Zhuang () and Vicki M. Bier

Risk Analysis, 2010, vol. 30, issue 12, 1737-1743

Abstract: In this article, we explore reasons that a defender might prefer secrecy or deception about her defensive resource allocations, rather than disclosure, in a homeland‐security context. Our observations not only summarize and synthesize the results of existing game‐theoretic work, but also provide intuitions about promising future research directions.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01455.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:riskan:v:30:y:2010:i:12:p:1737-1743

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Risk Analysis from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().