Ignorance Is Not Probability

William A. Huber

Risk Analysis, 2010, vol. 30, issue 3, 371-376

Abstract: The distinction between ignorance about a parameter and knowing only a probability distribution for that parameter is of fundamental importance in risk assessment. Brief dialogs between a hypothetical decisionmaker and a risk assessor illustrate this point, showing that the distinction has real consequences. These dialogs are followed by a short exposition that places risk analysis in a decision‐theoretic framework, describes the important elements of that framework, and uses these to shed light on Terje Aven's criticism of nonprobabilistic purely “objective” methods. Suggestions are offered concerning a more effective approach to evaluating those methods.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01361.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:riskan:v:30:y:2010:i:3:p:371-376

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