Improving Scientists’Judgments of Risk

Kenneth R. Hammond, Barry F. Anderson, Jeffrey Sutherland and Barbara Marvin

Risk Analysis, 1984, vol. 4, issue 1, 69-78

Abstract: Scientists disagree in their risk analyses because they use intuitive judgments to generalize results from the laboratory to circumstances not yet studied. If this assertion is correct, techniques intended to reduce intuitive judgments and increase analytical cognition should reduce scientific dispute. The results of a test case involving allegedly high risk and sharp dispute among scientists are described.

Date: 1984
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1984.tb00132.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:riskan:v:4:y:1984:i:1:p:69-78

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