Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

Harry F. Martz and Mark E. Johnson

Risk Analysis, 1987, vol. 7, issue 1, 35-47

Abstract: A quantitative probabilistic/systems analysis model is described which is useful for allocating resources to safeguard valuable documents or materials in either a fixed‐site facility or a moving convoy against an overt terrorist attack. The model is also useful for ranking the sensitive areas at a site according to their survivability of a given hypothesized terrorist attempt. To compare various defense strategies and security configurations, the probability of a successful terrorist activity is computed based on event tree models of the site/security configuration. This calculation incorporates a realistic engagement model (in the event a guard force engages the terrorists prior to completion of their objective) and information on barrier penetration times (for example, distribution of the time to defeat a chain link fence or vault door, traverse an open area, and so forth). Two security analyses are described to illustrate the methodology. One example considers a terrorist attack on a convoy transporting a missile from a storage to a launch facility. The second example involves an attack on a munitions storage facility.

Date: 1987
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:riskan:v:7:y:1987:i:1:p:35-47

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