Welfare Consequences of Alternative Insurance Contracts in the Mixed For‐Profit/Nonprofit Hospital Market

Avi Dor and Harry Watson

Southern Economic Journal, 1998, vol. 64, issue 3, 698-712

Abstract: With the advent of managed competition, contingent insurance contracts are replacing traditional fee‐for‐service plans that were based on pooling principles. Under contingent contracts, insurance is tied to particular providers, while under pooling contracts, insurance is provided for services rendered by all competing providers. To examine the implications of such contracts in hospital care, we model two competing hospitals, a for‐profit and a nonprofit, within the framework of a two‐stage game. With various assumptions concerning the objectives of the nonprofit, we are able to explore the welfare implications of different insurance contracts and the overprovision problem.

Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00088.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:64:y:1998:i:3:p:698-712

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().