The Median Voter According to GARP

Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Chinkun Chang

Southern Economic Journal, 1998, vol. 64, issue 4, 1001-1010

Abstract: This paper adapts the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) empirical method to the public goods problem to test whether observed municipal public spending can be explained “as if” the city governments maximize the utility of the median income voter. It applies the test procedure for medium‐size municipal governments in five Midwest states. The data are consistent with GARP and reveal that the local governments in the sample behave as if they maximize median voter utility once we control for the state‐specific effects, government management structure, and population density.

Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00116.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:64:y:1998:i:4:p:1001-1010

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().