Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information

Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau

Southern Economic Journal, 1998, vol. 65, issue 2, 322-330

Abstract: This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter‐vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.

Date: 1998
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00153.x

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Working Paper: Delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:2:p:322-330

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