Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition

George Norman and Lynne Pepall

Southern Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 66, issue 3, 667-681

Abstract: This paper investigates the profitability and locational effects of mergers when Cournot firms compete in spatially differentiated markets. A two‐firm merger is generally profitable because the merged partners can coordinate their location decisions. The merged firm locates its plants outside the market quartiles with distance from the market center being an increasing function of the number of nonmerged firms remaining at the market center. Profitable two‐firm mergers reduce competitive pressure, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer surplus. The merger increases total surplus by increased locational efficiency and the increased profits of the merged and nonmerged firms.

Date: 2000
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00280.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:66:y:2000:i:3:p:667-681

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