Are People Sometimes Too Honest? Increasing, Decreasing, and Negative Returns to Honesty

Atin Basuchoudhary and John Conlon

Southern Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 67, issue 1, 139-154

Abstract: We show that sender honesty can hurt receivers in simple signaling games. The receiver faces a trade‐off between its ability to work with senders and the quality of information it can get and use from them. Our example also contradicts recent work suggesting that returns to honesty should be increasing. Positive, increasing returns are restored in our model if the receiver can precommit.

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00325.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:139-154

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().