A Test of the Structure of PAC Contracts: An Analysis of House Gun Control Votes in the 1980s

Joseph P. McGarrity and Daniel Sutter

Southern Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 67, issue 1, 41-63

Abstract: We examine roll call votes on gun control in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980s to determine whether political action committees (PACs) make spot market purchases, prepay for votes in the prior election cycle, or make long‐term investments. Previous tests generally employ PAC contributions from only one cycle, which could impose the wrong structure on contracts between PACs and politicians, causing researchers to misestimate a contribution's impact. We find that money from more than one election cycle influences roll call votes, which suggests that PAC expenditures are not simple spot market or one‐period prepayment contracts. Most remarkably, we find that the National Rifle Association buys votes with contributions from three election cycles.

Date: 2000
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00320.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2000:i:1:p:41-63

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