Right‐to‐Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market

Steven E. Abraham and Paula B. Voost

Southern Economic Journal, 2000, vol. 67, issue 2, 345-362

Abstract: This article is an empirical examination of whether or not stockholder wealth rises in response to passage of a right‐to‐work law—a state law banning union security clauses from collective bargaining agreements. Stockholder wealth rose when Louisiana passed such a law in 1976 and when Idaho did so in 1985‐1986. Presumably this occurred because investors anticipated higher future profits with weaker labor unions or a lower probability of future organization. This is new evidence that such laws are more than symbolic: They hamper labor unions.

Date: 2000
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00340.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2000:i:2:p:345-362

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