Multinational Learning under Asymmetric Information

Neelam Jain () and Leonard Mirman

Southern Economic Journal, 2001, vol. 67, issue 3, 637-655

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational that the demand is low. The multinational reduces its output in the foreign market in order to signal‐jam. In addition, the multinational increases its production in the other market. However, total production of the multinational is lower. Implications for research and development expenditure by the multinational are examined.

Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2001.tb00360.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2001:i:3:p:637-655

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().