Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers

Joon Je Park, Michael W. Babcock, Kenneth Lemke and Dennis L. Weisman

Southern Economic Journal, 2001, vol. 67, issue 4, 938-953

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to add to the empirical literature regarding merger simulation analysis by examining the effect of railroad mergers on railroad market power. This is done by measuring railroad profits and revenue/variable cost ratios corresponding to different degrees of intrarailroad competition for movements of Kansas export wheat to Houston, Texas. Two models are developed to achieve the objectives of the study. A network model of the wheat logistics system is used to identify the least cost transportation routes from the Kansas study area to the market at Houston. A profit improvement algorithm, which identifies Nash equilibrium prices, is developed to measure the amount by which railroads can profitably raise their prices above variable cost. The results of the study have implications for U.S. railroad merger policy. The paper indicates that railroad mergers do not necessarily increase railroad market power or make railroad shippers worse off. Instead, the study demonstrates that the impact of railroad mergers on shippers and railroads depends on factors that vary geographically, such as the degree of intrarailroad and intermodal competition in the area.

Date: 2001
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2001.tb00382.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:67:y:2001:i:4:p:938-953

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