Classroom Game on the Theory of Rent Seeking: Some Practical Experience

Ivo Bischoff () and Kai Hofmann

Southern Economic Journal, 2002, vol. 69, issue 1, 195-199

Abstract: On the basis of our practical experience in applying the classroom game on rent seeking proposed by Goeree and Holt, we suggest two setup modifications and one extension to the original game. The modifications are intended to increase the teaching value of the classroom game by enlarging the choice space of the teams and further clarifying the welfare consequences of rent seeking. The extension is introduced to show that teams' high risk preference does not result from a misperception of the decision‐making problem. Instead, this preference is argued to be the consequence of the rivalrous nature of the game.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2002.tb00486.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:69:y:2002:i:1:p:195-199

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().