Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate

Franklin Mixon, Rand W. Ressler and M. Troy Gibson

Southern Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 70, issue 2, 414-424

Abstract: The present article analyzes signaling by elected officials of moderate or centrist legislative behavior from a benefits/costs perspective. To do so, we provide statistical evidence regarding the tendency of senators to join the U.S. Senate Centrist Coalition, a congressional membership organization of moderate legislators. We find that changes in party loyalty, perhaps due to changes in constituent preferences, and U.S. Senate tenure are both important determinants of membership in the Centrist Coalition. Tests also point out that freshman senators are more likely than more senior senators to seek membership as a form of information provision.

Date: 2003
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2003.tb00579.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:70:y:2003:i:2:p:414-424

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