Unintended Consequence of Centralized Public School Funding in Michigan Education

Ron Zimmer () and John T. Jones

Southern Economic Journal, 2005, vol. 71, issue 3, 534-544

Abstract: As part of the movement to create greater spending equity among school districts, states have centralized funding for public education and instituted funding formulas where high‐spending districts are often constrained in their operational expenditures. However, these school districts often maintain local discretion over capital expenditures financed by the sale of bonds. In this study, we find that Michigan's high‐spending school districts have a greater probability of issuing bonds after centralizing public school funding, indicating that debt financing of capital expenditures may have become a mechanism to allow these school districts to circumvent the policy's intent for greater spending equity.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00656.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:71:y:2005:i:3:p:534-544

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