Classroom Games: Candidate Convergence

Rick K. Wilson

Southern Economic Journal, 2005, vol. 71, issue 4, 913-922

Abstract: This article details an experiment that is easily run in the classroom. It demonstrates how two‐candidate elections quickly converge to an equilibrium. It points out that the equilibrium is centered on the median voter. Finally, it illustrates what happens when preferences or institutions change. Material associated with conducting the experiment is provided, as is supplemental material for classroom instruction.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00683.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:71:y:2005:i:4:p:913-922

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