The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government

Pierre Siklos and Martin T. Bohl

Southern Economic Journal, 2005, vol. 72, issue 2, 395-409

Abstract: In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989‐1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank president dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the “talking” of Bundesbank officials.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2005.tb00708.x

Related works:
Working Paper: The Bundesbank's Communications Strategy and Policy Conflicts with the Federal Government (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:395-409

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().