Taking Corporate Culture Seriously: Group Effects in the Trust Game

Daniel Arce

Southern Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 73, issue 1, 27-36

Abstract: The Trust Game is regarded as an important model of corporate culture in that social learning to promote trust creates organizational efficiencies consistent with the existence of firms. We examine the Trust Game from an evolutionary perspective in which player types are defined in terms of their commitment to trustworthy behavior. In so doing, a condition for multilevel selection (group effects) is identified. When group effects exist—implying that the matching process is not independent of players' commitment—a corporate culture emerges that promotes trust. This results in an evolutionary theory of business ethics.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2006.tb00755.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:73:y:2006:i:1:p:27-36

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