Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers: A Comment

Kazutoshi Miyazawa

Southern Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 73, issue 2, 546-547

Abstract: This note shows that Proposition 5 in Chang and Weisman (Southern Economic Journal 71:821–36) contains a mistake. Although not affecting the paper's basic intuition, our result shows that the parental transfer under the noncooperative game could be less than under the cooperative one if the children oversupply family services.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2006.tb00786.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:73:y:2006:i:2:p:546-547

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