Hunting the Whale: More Evidence on State Government Leviathans

Noel D. Campbell, R. Zachary Finney and David Mitchell

Southern Economic Journal, 2007, vol. 74, issue 2, 566-580

Abstract: Caplan holds that governments are Leviathans, seeking to extend their power by increasing government expenditures beyond the level preferred by voters. We extend Caplan's model by examining the real (percentage) growth rates of government. We also examine whether government size increases at an increasing rate as the minority party weakens. We find evidence that supports and fails to support the original Leviathan hypothesis. We also fail to support our extensions of Caplan's hypothesis. Furthermore, our significant and contrary results have intuitively appealing interpretations. From these results, we conclude that the impact of political party power on government spending is ambiguous.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00853.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:566-580

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