Self‐Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime

Sarah L. Stafford

Southern Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 74, issue 4, 934-951

Abstract: This paper adds to the debate over whether self‐policing can increase environmental protection by considering an issue that has been ignored in previous models—that self‐policing may influence future enforcement. The model combines self‐policing with targeted enforcement and allows for both deliberate and inadvertent violations. As expected, rewarding self‐policers with more lenient future enforcement increases auditing, remediation, and disclosure of inadvertent violations. Self‐policing can also serve as a complement to deliberate compliance and can thus further increase environmental performance. However, under reasonable conditions, self‐policing can be a substitute for deliberate compliance and could therefore be detrimental to environmental protection.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00874.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:74:y:2008:i:4:p:934-951

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