Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?

Alexander K. Koch and Hans‐Theo Normann

Southern Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 75, issue 1, 223-231

Abstract: Recent bargaining experiments demonstrate an effect of anonymity and incomplete information on behavior. This has rekindled the question whether “fair” behavior is inspired by regard for others or driven by external forces. To test this, we compare a dictator game treatment that provides receivers with information about the source of offers with one that does not, controlling for anonymity in a double‐blind setting. Combined with extant results, our findings suggest that about half of dictator giving observed in experiments is internally motivated, and the other half is driven by external factors, such as experimenter observability or regard by receivers.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00900.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:223-231

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