Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football

Brad Humphreys and Jane E. Ruseski

Southern Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 75, issue 3, 720-735

Abstract: We investigate self‐monitoring and enforcement of the NCAA player recruitment agreement in the context of a cartel model with incomplete information and reaction lags. Empirical results from a panel probit model strongly support the predictions of the model. Lagged winning percentage, the discount rate of the decision maker, the institution's commitment to nonathletic activities, and the institution's demand‐cost configuration are all important predictors of institutions being placed on probation for violating the cartel rules.

Date: 2009
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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2009.tb00928.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:75:y:2009:i:3:p:720-735

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