The Deadliest of Games: The Institution of Dueling

Christopher G. Kingston and Robert E. Wright

Southern Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 76, issue 4, 1094-1106

Abstract: Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational basis. Basically, under certain social and economic conditions, individuals must fight in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. We use a repeated two‐player sequential game with random matching to show how the institution of dueling could have functioned as a costly but incentive‐compatible means by which individuals could demonstrate their good faith dealings by defending their “honor.”

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:76:y:2010:i:4:p:1094-1106

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