Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank‐Order Tournaments

C. Jill Stowe and Scott M. Gilpatric

Southern Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 77, issue 1, 1-14

Abstract: In rank‐order tournaments, undesirable but output‐enhancing activities, such as cheating, may occur. Cheating may be especially tempting when one player has an advantage over another. We show that when audit probabilities are low (high), the leading (trailing) player has more incentive to cheat. Furthermore, we show that “correlated” audits are more effective at decreasing the frequency of cheating than independent audits. Finally, we show that differential monitoring schemes, where contestants are audited based on either their initial position or final ranking, more efficiently achieve full deterrence than schemes that monitor contestants with equal probability.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.1

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:1-14

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