R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

Vasileios Zikos

Southern Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 77, issue 1, 189-212

Abstract: We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable. When R&D subsidies are not available, in addition to the complete network, the private partial and the private‐hub star networks are Pareto efficient. However, the complete network becomes the unique Pareto efficient network when R&D is subsidized. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. It also highlights the role of a public firm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of efficiency, independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.189

Related works:
Working Paper: R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly (2008)
Working Paper: R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:189-212

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