Ill‐Defined versus Precise Pre‐Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma

Sujoy Chakravarty, Emmanuel Dechenaux and Jaideep Roy

Southern Economic Journal, 2010, vol. 77, issue 2, 351-368

Abstract: This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre‐play communication in a highly competitive two‐player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non‐binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre‐play communication whereby subjects can submit ill‐defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill‐defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill‐defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation.

Date: 2010
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https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.2.351

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:77:y:2010:i:2:p:351-368

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