On Delays in Project Completion with Cost Reduction: An Experiment

Shubhro Sarkar and Anthony M. Kwasnica

Southern Economic Journal, 2011, vol. 77, issue 3, 557-584

Abstract: We examine the voluntary provision of a public project via binary contributions when contributions may be made over multiple periods. In many situations, early contributors are likely to pay a higher cost than those who wait. We show that in such circumstances the provision of the project always involves delay. Because this game involves coordination on complex, dynamic strategies in the face of asymmetries in payoffs, we examine behavior in the laboratory.

Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.557

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:77:y:2011:i:3:p:557-584

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