Central Bank Independence, Wage Bargaining, and Labor Market Performance: New Evidence

Horst Feldmann

Southern Economic Journal, 2011, vol. 77, issue 3, 692-725

Abstract: Using data on 20 industrial countries over the period 1982 to 2003, this article finds central bank independence to favorably affect both unemployment and employment rates. The size of these effects appears to be substantial, particularly in the long term. In contrast to some of the previous literature, the article finds that the favorable effects of central bank independence do not depend on the degree of wage bargaining centralization or coordination. Furthermore, it finds that higher centralization as well as higher coordination of wage bargaining may also have favorable direct effects on labor market performance.

Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.692

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:77:y:2011:i:3:p:692-725

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