Military Conscription and the (Socially) Optimal Number of Boots on the Ground

Peter Berck and Jonathan Lipow

Southern Economic Journal, 2011, vol. 78, issue 1, 95-106

Abstract: In this article, we develop a model of military manpower mobilization. We use the model to evaluate the efficacy of volunteer‐ and conscription‐based manpower systems within a framework of social welfare maximization. We find that neither conscription nor a volunteer approach is likely to be “first best” because of asymmetries of information and constraints on the military pay structure. We then modify the general model by considering the possibility that recruits with high civilian productivity are also more capable soldiers and find that, under such circumstances, conscription may be a more benign form of manpower mobilization than previously understood. We also consider and evaluate various alternatives available to militaries attempting to minimize the welfare losses associated with manpower mobilization.

Date: 2011
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-78.1.95

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2011:i:1:p:95-106

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