Water Externalities: Tragedy of the Common Canal

Charles Holt, Cathleen A. Johnson, Courtney A. Mallow and Sean Sullivan

Southern Economic Journal, 2012, vol. 78, issue 4, 1142-1162

Abstract: Laboratory experiments are used to investigate alternative solutions to the allocation problem of a common‐pool resource with unidirectional flow. Focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of nonbinding communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, allocation by auction, and allocation by exogenous usage fee. All solutions improve allocative efficiency, but communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed optimal fee results in the greatest allocative efficiency, closely followed by an auction allocation that determines the usage fee endogenously.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-78.4.1142

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2012:i:4:p:1142-1162

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