Environmental Depletion, Governance, and Conflict

Horatiu Rus

Southern Economic Journal, 2012, vol. 78, issue 4, 1305-1332

Abstract: While the link between natural resource dependence and internal conflict has been approached from a variety of angles in a large and growing interdisciplinary literature, the feasibility‐discontent dichotomy still frames a fluid research agenda in both economics and political science. This article attempts to help bridge the gap by allowing for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of potential rebels. Simple non‐cooperative bargaining yields a nonlinear impact of regulatory quality on the likelihood of conflict and shows that corruption and resource depletion jointly affect the outcome. The empirical analysis that follows looks at the effect of environmental depletion and government corruption on the emergence of civil conflicts using a large panel data set. Resource depletion, the quality of governance, and their interaction are found to be significant determinants of civil conflict incidence. Results are robust to model and specification as well as to several steps taken to address potential endogeneity concerns.

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-78.4.1305

Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Depletion, Governance and Conflict (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:78:y:2012:i:4:p:1305-1332

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().