Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations

William Chan and Priscilla Man

Southern Economic Journal, 2012, vol. 79, issue 1, 144-160

Abstract: Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank‐order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial primary elections.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-79.1.144

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:79:y:2012:i:1:p:144-160

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