Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule

Dongwon Lee, Thomas E. Borcherding and Youngho Kang

Southern Economic Journal, 2014, vol. 80, issue 3, 614-632

Abstract: This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent‐seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent‐seeking activities are price‐inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending, other things equal. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.205

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:80:y:2014:i:3:p:614-632

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