Waiting for Signaling Quality

Hikmet Gunay

Southern Economic Journal, 2014, vol. 81, issue 2, 364-386

Abstract: When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying until the next period, with the hope of learning the unknown quality. I analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. I show when the monopolist offers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. I also find two types of separating equilibria: one where the high‐type monopolist signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low‐type monopolist in the first period and another where the high‐type monopolist announces the product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signaling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signaling device.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.137

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Working Paper: Waiting For Signalling Quality (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:81:y:2014:i:2:p:364-386

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