Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n

George R. Crowley

Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 81, issue 3, 742-768

Abstract: This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature.

Date: 2015
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2013.075

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:81:y:2015:i:3:p:742-768

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