Liberalizing Reforms and the European Union: Accession, Membership, and Convergence

Danko Tarabar and Andrew T. Young

Southern Economic Journal, 2017, vol. 83, issue 4, 932-951

Abstract: The European Union (EU) may promote reforms to policies and institutions through at least two distinct mechanisms. First, accession to the EU requires countries to undertake reforms. Second, the EU common market may promote Tiebout jurisdictional competition. We empirically evaluate these two mechanisms using an unbalanced panel of up to 45 European countries during 1970–2010. We find that relationships between EU accession/membership and measures of policies/institutions are often statistically insignificant. Furthermore, when the estimated effects are statistically significant they are generally modest.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12183

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:83:y:2017:i:4:p:932-951

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().