The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action

George R. Crowley

Southern Economic Journal, 2019, vol. 86, issue 2, 667-690

Abstract: The foundational model of distributive politics predicts a positive relationship between the number of legislative districts and the level of inefficiency of projects approved by the legislature—Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen's “Law of 1/n.” This relationship has been tested extensively in the empirical literature, with mixed results. This article presents a model wherein passing the omnibus legislation typical of distributive politics is a costly process. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between legislature size and spending as increasing the size of the legislature also increases the costs of collective action. Results from an empirical exercise based on U.S. state legislatures (1962–2014) are consistent with the proposed model, showing a 1/n effect which diminishes at the margin as the legislature's size increases, especially in the lower chamber.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:86:y:2019:i:2:p:667-690

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