The effects of medical malpractice tort reform on physician supply an analysis of legislative changes from 2009 to 2016

Charles L. Baum

Southern Economic Journal, 2020, vol. 87, issue 2, 540-575

Abstract: Advocates of tort reform blame medical malpractice lawsuits for rising healthcare costs, prompting politicians in some states to pass tort reform capping noneconomic damages. In this analysis, I examine the effects of caps on noneconomic damages between 2009 and 2016 on the supply of physicians. I use multiple model specifications, examine physicians in high‐risk specialties, young physicians, and physicians in state‐border counties, and explore the potential for asymmetric effects using instances where tort reform has been declared unconstitutional and removed. I find few statistically significant effects. Supplemental analyses show that this may be because the noneconomic damage caps do not significantly affect malpractice insurance premiums, payouts, or claims in the first place.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12465

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:87:y:2020:i:2:p:540-575

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Southern Economic Journal from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().