R&D incentives and competitive pressure under hidden information

Maria Romano

Southern Economic Journal, 2021, vol. 88, issue 1, 56-78

Abstract: Within a principal‐agent model, the paper studies how hidden information affects incentives to invest in demand‐enhancing R&D of a firm competing in the product market. The analysis shows that, when the R&D outcome is private information of the innovating firm not only compared to its competitor, but also relative to its supplier, a contractual cost arises which neutralizes the standard strategic benefit of R&D and reduces the incentives to invest. Moreover, within this setting, more intense competition always stifles innovation.

Date: 2021
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https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12503

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:88:y:2021:i:1:p:56-78

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