ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES

Guilherme Carmona

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2005, vol. 07, issue 04, 491-499

Abstract: We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε–perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing from the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect equilibria: A strategyfis a perfect equilibrium in such a gameGif and only if it is an1/n–perfect equilibrium inGnfor alln, where{Gn}stands for our approximation sequence.

JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: On games of perfect information: equilibria, e-equilibria and approximation by simple games (2003)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000661

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