On games of perfect information: equilibria, e-equilibria and approximation by simple games

Guilherme Carmona

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an "!perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect equilibria: a strategy f is a perfect equilibrium in such a game G if and only if it is an 1=n!perfect equilibrium in Gn for all n, where fGng stand for our approximation sequence.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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