ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES

Mathieu Martin () and Vincent Merlin ()
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Mathieu Martin: THEMA, Departments of Economics, Université de Cergy Pontoise, 33 Boulevard du Port, 95011 Cergy Pontoise cedex, France

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, vol. 08, issue 04, 643-654

Abstract: This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles (1990) for quota games.

Keywords: Voting game; core; stability set; JEL Classification: C7; JEL Classification: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games (2006)
Working Paper: On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games (2006)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198906001156

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