CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER AMBIGUITY: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH

Marcello Basili and Fulvio Fontini

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2007, vol. 09, issue 01, 59-66

Abstract: In the paper a game between private and public individuals is set in order to study under which conditions the former would like to limitex-antethe choices of the latter. Ambiguity, as distinguished from risk, is explicitly introduced by means of capacities and Choquet Expected Utility. It is shown that constitutional constraints are necessary to prevent private individuals from being exploited by public individuals whenever citizens feel a too high level of ambiguity.

Keywords: Games with ambiguity; Constitutional constraints; exploitation; choquet expected utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001278

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