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CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES

Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov and Stef Tijs
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Rodica Branzei: Faculty of Computer Science, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania
Stef Tijs: Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2008, vol. 10, issue 04, 363-372

Abstract: In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.

Keywords: Convex games; core; dual games; marginal games; total clan games; Weber set; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198908001996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Convex games versus clan games (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Convex Games versus Clan Games (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Convex Games versus Clan Games (2006) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908001996

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